最近正在读巴菲特给股东的信，从1957开始。当时巴菲特还只是一个27岁的青年投资者，仅有两年正式的职业投资经验。1954-1956年，巴菲特曾经在格雷厄姆的投资公司工作。在那之前，巴菲特提出免费给格雷厄姆工作，但遭到了拒绝。他给股东的信忠实的记录了一个投资者成长的历程。
 
        在1957-1961年的信中，有几段话吸引了我的注意：
 
        基金的目标
 
       “My continual objective in managing partnership funds is to achieve along-term performance record superior to that of the Industrial Average. I believe this Average, over a period of years, will more orless parallel the results of leading investment companies. Unless we do achieve this superior performance there is no reason for existence of the partnerships.”
 
      “我管理合伙基金的一贯目标是取得优于道琼斯工业平均指数的长期业绩。我坚信这一平均指数在长期将与领先的投资公司的业绩相类似。除非我们取得这样优异的业绩，否则我们的合伙基金没有理由存在下去。”
 　
      （1960年给合伙人的信）
 　
        巴菲特最初的目标是长期业绩超越指数。这个目标至今没有改变。
 
        如何获得超越市场的业绩
 　
      “However,I have pointed out that any superior record which we might accomplish should not be expected to be evidenced by a relatively constant advantage in performance compared to the Average. Rather it is likely that if such an advantage is achieved, it will be through better-than-average performance in stable or declining markets and average, or perhaps even poorer- than-average performance in rising markets.”
 
        “但是，我曾经指出，即使我们可能取得优秀的业绩，这也不能证明我们能保持相对稳定的对道琼斯工业平均指数的优势。如果我们获得优势，也是通过在平稳或下跌市场中超出平均的业绩，在上涨的市场中获得平均业绩，甚至有可能是逊于平均的业绩而达到。”
 
        （1960年给合伙人的信）
 
         巴菲特告诉自己的合伙人，自己超越市场不是持续稳定的超越，具有稳定的优势，而是在市场不好时超越，在市场狂热时表现一般，甚至逊色。换句话说，战胜市场不是多赢，而是少输。　
 
        衡量业绩的标准
 
         “I believe in establishing yardsticks prior to the act; retrospectively, almost anything can be made to look good in relation to something or other.

I have continuously used the Dow-Jones Industrial Average as our measure of par. It is my feeling that three years is a very minimal test of performance, and the best test consists of a period at least that long where the terminal level of the Dow is reasonably close to the initial level.
 
        While the Dow is not perfect (nor is anything else) as a measure of performance, it has the advantage of being widely known, has a long period of continuity, and reflects with reasonable accuracy the experience of investors generally with the market.”
 
        “我坚信在行动前制定标准。因为事后再看，几乎任何事情，相对于某些其他事物，都能显得很好。　　
 
         我一直用道琼斯工业平均指数作为我们衡量的基准。我感觉三年是检验业绩的最短时间。最佳的检验至少要包括三年的时间，而道琼斯指数的终值与初始值相当接近。　
 
        虽然道琼斯指数并不是衡量业绩的完美指标（任何事物都不是），但这个指数有着广为人知，长期的连续性，以及相当准确的反映了市场投资者情况的优势。”　　
 
        （1961年给合伙人的信）　　
 
         巴菲特选取指数是为了有一个公平的标准。而且，他认为要评价投资业绩最少要三年的时间，而且最好是在这段时间里市场持平。这样才能体现出投资的真实业绩，而不是短期运气，或者随着市场水涨船高。　
 
        保守的投资

“Many people so me years back thought they were behaving in the most conservative manner by purchasing medium or long-term municipal or government bonds. This policy has produced substantial market depreciation in many cases, and most certainly has failed to maintain or increase real buying power.　
 
         Conscious, perhaps overly conscious, of inflation, many people now feel that they are behaving in a conservative manner by buying blue chip securities almost regardless of price-earnings ratios, dividend yields, etc. Without the benefit of hindsight as in the bond example, I feel this course of action is fraught with danger. There is nothing at all conservative, in my opinion, about speculating as to just how high a multiplier a greedy and capricious public will put on earnings.”　　
 
          “True conservatism is only possible through knowledge and reason.”　　
 
           “多年前很多人认为购买中期或者长期政府债券是最保守的做法。这种方式造成了大量的损失，而且肯定无法保持或者增加真实购买力。　
 
           由于意识到通胀，甚至过于担心通胀，很多人认为他们不顾市盈率、股息率等指标购买大型蓝筹股是保守的做法。即使不考虑过去债券的例子，我也认为这种做法充满危险。在我看来，投机毫无保守可言，投机只不过是猜想贪婪而变化无常的公众能给盈利多高的倍数。”　　
 
          “真正的保守惟有通过知识和理性才有可能。”　
 
           （1961年给合伙人的信）　　
 
            50年前的忠告同样适合今天的人们。不顾租售比，不考虑价格买房的人并不是在通胀条件下进行保守的保值投资。预期房价不断上涨，其实就是预期贪婪而变化无常的公众将给房子支付更高的价格。

  内在价值的回归与卖出时机
 
          被低估股票的价格何时能回归内在价值？如何才能回归内在价值？在什么情况下要卖出所投资的股票？巴菲特的回答如下：
 
        “Some times these work out very fast; many times they take years. It is difficult at the time of purchase to know any specific reason why they should appreciate in price. However, because of this lack of glamour or anything pending which might create immediate favorable market action, they are available at very cheap prices. A lot of value can be obtained for the price paid. This substantial excess of value creates a comfortable margin of safety in each transaction. This individual margin of safety, coupled with a diversity of commitments creates a most attractive package of safety and appreciation potential. Over the years our timing of purchases has been considerably better than our timing of sales. We do not go into these generals with the idea of getting the last nickel, but are usually quite content selling out at some intermediate level between our purchase price and what we regard as fair value to a private owner.”
 
         “有时候很快就能实现。更多的时候，需要几年。在买入的时候很难知道有哪一个具体的原因让股票价格应该上涨。但是，正是由于这种缺乏魅力或者没有期待，才有可能创造出当前有利的市场机会。这些股票可以用非常便宜的价格获得。通过支付低价，我们能获得很多价值。这种大量的超额价值在每个交易中创造出一个相当大的安全边际。这种个股的安全边际加上投资的分散性，创造出了一个最有吸引力的组合，具有安全性和升值潜力。在过去几年，我们买入的时间点一直远好于卖出的时机。我们买入这些股票时并没有想获得最后一分钱的利润。我们往往满足于在买入价和合理价位中间卖掉。我们认为的合理价位是对私人业主来说公平的价格。”
 
         (1961年给合伙人的信)
 
          价值投资的安全性 
 
          价值投资的安全性不是来自于高超的卖点选择，而是来自于买入的低价。 
 
          By buying assets at a bargain price, we don't need to pull any rabbits out of a hat to get extremely good percentage gains. This is the cornerstone of our investment philosophy: “Never count on making a good sale. Have the purchase price be so attractive that even a mediocre sale gives good results. The better sales will be the frosting on the cake.”
 
         通过低价买入资产，我们无需施展魔术才能得到非常好的百分比回报。我们投资哲学的基石是：“绝不指望好的卖出。而是让购买价格如此之诱人，即使一个平庸的卖出也能带来良好的回报。更好的卖出将会是锦上添花。”
 
         (1962年给合伙人的信)
 
         股市下跌的情况
 
         价值投资，安全边际，购买便宜的股票也不能避免下跌。市场涨跌左右短期表现。
 
         The generals tend to behave market-wise very much in sympathy with the Dow. Just because something is cheap does not mean it is not going to go down. During abrupt downward movements in the market, this segment may very well go down percentage-wise just as much as the Dow. Over a period of years, I believe the generals will outperform the Dow, and during sharply advancing years like 1961, this is the section of our portfolio that turns in the best results. It is, of course, also the most vulnerable in a declining market.
 
          我们的股票倾向与市场表现一致。便宜并不意味着不会进一步下跌。在市场突然下跌的时候，这些股票完全可能与道琼斯指数一样，下降同样的百分比。从长期看，我相信这些股票将超过道琼斯指数的表现。在1961年那样猛烈上涨的市场，这部分股票在我们的投资组合中表现是最佳的。当然，在一个下跌的市场，这部分也是最容易受到损失的。
 
         (1961年给合伙人的信)
 
         对投资人的承诺 
 
         结果无法保证，目标可以承诺，投入全部身家，与合伙人利益保持高度一致。
 
         I can not promise results to partners. What I can and do promise is that:

a.Our investments will be chosen on the basis of value, not popularity;
 
         b.That we will attempt to bring risk of permanent capital loss (not short-term quotational loss) to an absolute minimum by obtaining a wide margin of safety in each commitment and a diversity ofcommitments;and

c.My wife, children and I will have virtually our entire net worth invested in the partnership.
 
         我无法对合伙人承诺结果。我能够承诺而且确定承诺的是：
 
         a.我们投资的选择是基于价值，而不是流行。
 
         b.我们会试图把资本永久损失（而不是短期账面损失）的风险降到绝对最低。而这是通过每个投资的大的安全边际和投资的分散性达到的。
 
        c.我的妻子，孩子和我将把我们几乎全部的净值都投资在合伙基金中。
 
         (1962年给合伙人的信)
 
         对投资业绩的检验
 
         市场下跌是对投资是否保守的客观考验。无需患得患失，少输胜过多赢。
 
          I feel the most objective test as to just how conservative our manner of investing is arises through evaluation of performance in down markets. Preferably these should involve a substantial decline in the Dow.
 
         我认为通过评估在下跌市场中的业绩，我们可以得到最客观的关于投资方式有多保守的检验。最好是道琼斯指数下跌很多的时候。
 
        (1962年给合伙人的信) 

       Our job is to pile up yearly advantages over the performance of the Dow without worrying too much about whether the absolute results in a given year are a plus or a minus. I would consider a year in which we were down 15% and the Dow declined 25% to be much superior to a year when both the partnership and the Dow advanced 20%.
 
        我们的任务是积累年复一年超越道琼斯指数的业绩，而不是过度担心某一年的绝对结果是正还是负。我认为道指下跌25%而我们只下跌15%的一年要远好于道指和我们都上涨20%的一年。 
        (1962年给合伙人的信)